Arrest of a life time: Eddie Jackson (shot 1977, died 2003) finally to be inducted into the Chicago Police Officers Memorial on September 13, 2016. see below articles:
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2011/01/27/police-officers-head-out-for-gunmans-parole-hearing/
Parole Denied For Man Who Shot
Chicago Cop
January 27, 2011 5:33 AM
Chicago Police Officers head to
Springfield to fight against parole for a man
Updated
01/27/11 – 3:29 p.m.
CHICAGO
(CBS) — Parole has been
denied to a man convicted of shooting a Chicago police officer more than 30
years ago.
Dozens of Chicago police
officers traveled to Springfield on Thursday to attend the parole hearing for
Lee Jones, who was convicted of attempted murder for shooting Officer Eddie
Jackson on Oct. 14, 1977.
Jones was denied parole
on Thursday and won’t have another parole hearing for three years.
Jones was sentenced to
50 to 100 years in prison for shooting Jackson in the head during a traffic
stop on Oct. 14, 1977. Jackson survived the shooting, but was left paralyzed
and in a wheelchair until his death in 2003.
As CBS 2’s Susanna Song
reports, 27 officers took off on a bus from Chicago Police Headquarters, 3510
S. Michigan Ave., around 4:15 a.m. to attend Jones’ parole hearing in
Springfield.
For the past three
years, Jones has been up for parole, and each year, officers have gone to
Springfield to make sure he remains behind bars.
“Everybody, pretty much,
who was with him at that time has retired from the job,” said Chicago Police
Sgt. Frank Iglinski, “so these are all officers that are representing him and
his family at a parole hearing. We just want to establish that we don’t forget
what Mr. Jones has done to us. Officer Jackson … is still part of our
community.”
The
officers wore their uniforms to the hearing. They did not plan to testify,
instead planning to stand silently during the hearing.
PEOPLE v. JONES
No. 78-2017.
88 Ill. App.3d 629 (1980)
410 N.E.2d 1122
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. LEE JONES, a/k/a/ Lee A. Momient, Defendant-Appellant.
Appellate Court of Illinois — First District (4th Division).
Opinion filed September 18, 1980.
Attorney(s)
appearing for the Case
Ralph Ruebner and Gordon Berry, both of
State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Bernard Carey, State's Attorney, of
Chicago (Marcia B. Orr and Iris E. Sholder, Assistant State's Attorneys, of
counsel), for the People.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Lee Jones, also known as Lee Momient, was
charged by information with attempt murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par.
8-4) and three counts of aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38,
pars. 12-4(a), 12-4(b)(1)). Following a trial by jury, defendant was found
guilty of all charges. Judgment was entered upon attempt murder and defendant
was sentenced to a term of 50 to 100 years' imprisonment. From the conviction,
defendant appeals and raises the following issues: (1) His assignment to a
special recidivist court was prejudicial and unconstitutional;
[88 Ill.
App.3d 631]
(2) the
jury was prejudiced by seeing him in handcuffs and under guard of a deputy
sheriff; (3) it was error for the State to be allowed to present evidence of
identification where no issue of identification was raised; and (4) his
election between sentencing codes was not intelligently made.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On October 14, 1977, Chicago Police Officers Alfred
Williams, Rudolph Winston, Karl Manuel and Eddie Jackson were assigned to a
detail to arrest prostitutes. The patrol involved officers wearing civilian
clothes and driving unmarked cars.
At approximately 1 a.m., the officers arrested Cassandra
Brooks for prostitution at 800 North Clark Street, in Chicago. Brooks was
placed in the car driven by Officer Jackson. Leaving the scene of the arrest
shortly thereafter, Officer Jackson turned west onto Elm Street and stopped at
the intersection of Elm and LaSalle Street. While he was waiting at the stop
sign, a gray Lincoln Continental automobile, traveling north on LaSalle,
swerved at the intersection and then came to a stop in the middle of the
street, approximately 4 or 5 car lengths north of the intersection. Officer
Jackson turned the corner, northbound onto LaSalle Street, and drove between
the Lincoln and another car parked at the curb. The officer's car and the
Lincoln were about 8 or 12 inches apart. The driver of the Lincoln lowered his
electric window on the passenger side and yelled, "You almost hit
me." Officer Jackson responded that he did not. The driver repeated his
taunt and Officer Jackson again responded. After the verbal exchange had taken
place a third time, the driver leaned over, raised his hand with a gun in it,
and fired one shot which struck Officer Jackson in the head. The driver of the
Lincoln, who was later identified as defendant, sped away.
Officer Manuel testified he saw the car in question when
it and Officer Jackson's car were stopped next to each other, but he could not
hear the conversation. He heard a loud noise and when he saw the Lincoln drive
away he followed it. Officer Manuel was able to see the license number, ILL
269.
Verna Jones, defendant's wife, testified at trial. She
said defendant left their apartment early in the morning on October 14, 1977.
He was driving her 1977 Lincoln Continental which had license plates, ILL 269.
Defendant called her later that day and told her to report her car stolen. The
witness stated defendant's voice sounded nervous and scared.
Chicago Police Officers Wayne Johnson and (Tim McGady) John
Rice responded to a radio call to locate the Lincoln in question. Officer
Johnson and his partner (Tim McGady) apprehended and arrested defendant farther
north. When Officer Rice arrived at the scene, he looked inside the car and
found a pistol lying with the "butt up" against the transmission
hump. The gun and defendant were taken to the police station.
Later that same morning, a lineup was held. Defendant was
identified
[88 Ill.
App.3d 632]
by
Officers Williams and Winston. Cassandra Brooks also picked defendant out of
the lineup but was uncertain of her identification.
Officer William Scanlon of the mobile unit crime lab of
the Chicago Police Department examined the car driven by Officer Jackson. A
bullet was found on the rear seat. Officer Scanlon also examined the recovered
weapon. It was a .357 python revolver. Two cartridges and two casings remained
in the cylinder. Donald Ginell, a firearms examiner for the police department,
performed test firings of the weapon and determined the bullet found in the car
driven by Officer Jackson had been fired from the gun recovered at the time of
defendant's arrest.
A stipulation by the parties was admitted into evidence.
It stated that if Dr. Vinod Sahgal, a neurologist, were called, he would
testify Officer Jackson received a bullet wound in the left frontal area and an
exit wound in the upper rear area of his head. Part of his skull was lost and
substantial brain damage occurred. Jackson was left paralyzed on his right
side, including loss of vision in his right eye.
After hearing the evidence, the jury found defendant
guilty of attempt murder and aggravated battery. Judgment was entered only for
attempt murder.
At the post-trial hearing, defendant testified, in
mitigation, that the shooting was an accident. He had stopped his car because
he wanted to avoid an accident. He said he "pulled the pistol and it went
off." Defendant said he had obtained the gun 6 hours earlier at a gambling
house and did not intend to harm the police officer.
Defendant's primary contention is based upon the fact
that prior to trial defense counsel was denied a motion for change of venue and
reassignment. The motion was filed because the trial court was a specially
created recidivist court to which defendant objected on various grounds. He
argues that assignment to such a special court was unconstitutional and created
an unacceptable risk of prejudice. The State responds that the special courts
are not unconstitutional.
In review of this issue of first impression, we turn to
the authority of the Illinois Supreme Court. The court has set the standard for
determining prejudice where, as here, there may be prior knowledge by jurors of
facts and issues to be heard. In People
v. Black (1972), 52 Ill.2d 544, 557, 288 N.E.2d 376, 384, the court held:
Jurors
need not be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. It is sufficient
if the juror can lay aside his impression and render a verdict based on the
evidence presented. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 6 L.Ed.2d 751, 81 S.Ct. 1639;
People v. Williams, 40 Ill.2d 522.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a State may
distinguish between classes of offenders and employ differing schemes of
prosecution in order to facilitate, expedite, and reduce expense. (See Johnson v.
[88 Ill.
App.3d 633]
Louisiana (1972), 406 U.S. 356, 32 L.Ed.2d 152, 92 S.Ct.
1620.) The court has also upheld recidivist statutes as constitutional. (See Spencer v. Texas (1967), 385 U.S. 554, 17 L.Ed.2d 606, 87 S.Ct.
648;Oyler v. Boles (1962), 368 U.S. 448, 7 L.Ed.2d 446, 82 S.Ct.
501.) Though these cases may be factually distinguishable from ours, they do represent
authority for State judicial systems to categorize offenders and prosecutorial
procedures.
• 1 The constitution of this State provides:
Subject
to the authority of the Supreme Court, the Chief Judge [of the circuit court]
shall have general administrative authority over his court, including authority
to provide for divisions, general or specialized, and for appropriate times and
places of holding court. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 7(c).)
The establishment of special courts for recidivist cases
is in line with our interpretation of the Illinois Constitution. So long as the
expedience and efficiency sought to be achieved are not accomplished at the
expense of undue prejudice to defendants, such procedures are proper.
• 2 Moreover, defendant suggests we reverse the judgment
because recidivist courtrooms create an "unacceptable risk of
prejudice." We will not reverse the trial court on such a speculative
standard. The record does not reflect nor does defendant argue actual
prejudice. The motion for change of venue and reassignment was properly denied.
Defendant contends that his being viewed in handcuffs was
error. It is preferable for defendants not to be seen in handcuffs and in
custody of the sheriff. However, the fact that jurors may see a defendant in
handcuffs is not so inherently prejudicial as to require a mistrial. People v. Hyche(1978), 63 Ill.App.3d 575, 583, 380 N.E.2d 373, 379.
• 3 Nor was it reversible error for the trial court to
allow Officers Williams and Winston, who witnessed the shooting, to testify
they identified defendant in a lineup. Identification of a defendant as the
person responsible for a crime is a key issue in a criminal case. Although
identification may not have been directly at issue, defendant still had to be
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He was not shown to have been harmed
or prejudiced by the identification testimony.
Finally, defendant urges that a trial court be required
to disclose what sentence would be imposed under alternate sentencing codes,
prior to or at the time of election. To support his position, defendant cites
authority which requires the accused to be allowed to make an informal election
between such codes. We see a distinction between defendant's argument and what
he purports to be the rule.
Because defendant shot Officer Jackson in 1977, prior to
the effective date of the new sentencing code, he was entitled to elect between
the sentencing provisions in effect at that time (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38,
pars. 8-4(c)(1), 1005-8-1(b)(2)), or the provisions in effect at the time of
trial,
[88 Ill.
App.3d 634]
under
which he could be sentenced as a repeat offender and given an extended term
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 8-4(c)(1), 1005-5-3, 1005-8-1(b)(2),
1005-8-2). Defendant is given the right to elect under section 8-2-4 (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1008-2-4).
Defendant filed a motion, asking the court to reveal what
sentence the judge intended to impose under each code. The judge declined,
stating he would make such a disclosure only if he felt it essential to an
intelligent election.
• 4, 6 We agree with the trial court that disclosure of
the actual sentences to be imposed under each statute is not required for an
intelligent election between sentencing codes. Although a trial judge should
explain old and new provisions on the maximum penalties provided under each
code, the defendant does not have the right to be sentenced under both laws and
then to choose the sentence he prefers. (People v. Puckett (1979), 70 Ill.App.3d 743, 748, 388 N.E.2d 1293, 1297; People v. Dozier(1979), 67 Ill.App.3d 611, 615, 385 N.E.2d 155, 158.) Instead, the
burden is upon counsel, not the court, to explain and suggest what appears to
be the best course. (People v. Warfel (1979), 67 Ill.App.3d 620, 627, 385 N.E.2d 175, 180.) There is no
error in the trial court's refusing to disclose the specific sentences it would
impose under each statute.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit
court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
LINN, P.J., and ROMITI, J., concur.
